Note: CR is on vacation, and I will return on October 21st.

In early 2009, many analysts were predicting the 2nd Great Depression. However I started seeing some positive signs ... and I was able to call the end of the recession in mid-2009.

From January 2009: Vehicle Sales

David Rosenberg at Merrill Lynch wrote a research piece last week: "Not Your Father’s Recession ...(But Maybe Your Grandfather’s)" (no link)

Needless to say, the piece wasn't too upbeat.

But I was intrigued by some of the comments on vehicle sales.
...
Currently this ratio is at 23.9 years, the highest ever. This is an unsustainable level (I doubt most vehicles will last 24 years!), and the ratio will probably decline over the next few years. This could happen with vehicles being removed from the fleet, but more likely because of a sales increase.
...
Sales won't increase right away (look at the depressed sales during the early '80s), but this does suggest that auto sales are closer to the bottom than the top, and that auto sales will increase significantly in the future - although sales in 2009 will probably be dismal.

And from February 2009: Looking for the Sun

2009 will be a grim economic year. The unemployment rate will rise all year, house prices will fall, commercial real estate (CRE) will get crushed ... but there might be a few rays of sunshine too.
...
Even though most of the economic news will be ugly in 2009, my guess is all three of these series will find a bottom (or at least the pace of decline will slow significantly). This means that the drag on employment in these industries, and the drag on GDP, will slow or stop.

These will be rays of sunshine in a very dark season. That doesn't mean a thaw, but it will be a beginning ...

CR Note: I do not have a crystal ball, but I was looking past the horrible day-to-day numbers and starting to see the end of the recession.

Note: CR is on vacation, and I will return on October 21st.

In December 2007, most analysts were still dramitically underestimating the probably losses for lenders and financial institutions.

Here is an article from the WSJ quoting a crazy blogger: How High Will Subprime Losses Go?

The global race is on to find the best phrase to describe the housing and credit mess. The U.K.’s Telegraph quotes an economist who says it “could make 1929 look like a walk in the park” if central banks don’t solve the crisis in a matter of weeks.

The report cites the recent prediction from Barclays Capital that losses from the subprime-mortgage meltdown could hit $700 billion. That would top Merrill Lynch’s recent estimate of $500 billion. The Australian newspaper notes that a $700 billion “bloodbath” — potentially leading the U.S. economy into “the blackest year since the Great Depression” — would top the GDPs of all but 15 nations.

Back in the U.S., the Calculated Risk blog sidestepped the colorful language and went straight for the big number: “The losses for the lenders and investors might well be over $1 trillion.”

Many people thought I was crazy. But losses for lenders and financial institutions ended up over $1 Trillion.

And if you look at the post the WSJ referenced, the first paragraph starts: "Within the next couple of years, probably somewhere between 10 million and 20 million U.S. homeowners will owe more on their homes, than their homes are worth."

I was a grizzly bear!

CR Note: On vacation. I will return on October 21st (If I don't get lost!)

In December 2006, my friend Doris "Tanta" Dungey started writing for Calculated Risk.

From December 2006, until she passed away from ovarian cancer on Nov 30, 2008, Tanta was my co-blogger. Tanta worked as a mortgage banker for 20 years, and we started chatting in early 2005 about the housing bubble and the changes in lending practices. In 2006, Tanta was diagnosed with late stage cancer, and she took an extended medical leave while undergoing treatment. While on medical leave she wrote for this blog, and her writings received widespread attention and acclaim.

If you want to understand the mortgage industry, read Tanta's posts (here is The Compleat UberNerd and a Compendium of Tanta's Posts).

As an example, here is a brief excerpt from Foreclosure Sales and REO For UberNerds

The following is not an exhaustive discussion of all of the issues involved in foreclosures and REO. It’s a start at unpacking some of the concepts and definitions. We have been seeing, and are going to continue to see, a lot of information presented on foreclosure sales, REO sales, and their impacts on existing home transaction volumes and prices in various market areas. As always with “UberNerd” posts, this is long and excruciating. Proceed with typical motivation as you may consider your own best interest in an open market in blog postings.

And an excerpts from Mortgage Servicing for UberNerds

StillLearning asked in the comments about mortgage servicing, and since y’all are nerds, not dummies, here’s my highly-selective occasionally-oversimplified summary for you that skips the boring parts like how your check gets out of the “lockbox” and that stuff. We can discuss extra-credit issues like “excess servicing” and “subservicing” and “SFAS 144 meets MSR” and “negative convexity” and other kinds of inside baseball in the comments. There is a lot that can be said about loan servicing, but let’s start with the basics:

Servicers have two major types of servicing portfolio: loans they service for themselves and loans they service for other investors. In accounting terms, the “compensation” is the same, meaning that even if you are the noteholder, you pay yourself to service the loans in the same way that an outside investor would pay you, and it shows on the books that way. The differences in compensation stem from the basic fact that one is generally more motivated to do a good job servicing (particularly collecting and efficiently liquidating REO) for one’s own investment than for someone else’s.

Also see In Memoriam: Doris "Tanta" Dungey for photos, links to obituaries in the NY Times, Washington Post and much more.

NOTE: I'm on vacation returning next week. Government data might be rescheduled due to the government shutdown.

The key economic reports this week are September CPI, Retail Sales and Housing Starts.

For manufacturing, September Industrial Production, and the October New York and Philly Fed surveys will be released this week.

----- Monday, October 13th -----
Columbus Day Holiday: Banks will be closed in observance of Columbus Day. The stock market will be open.

----- Tuesday, October 14th -----
6:00 AM: NFIB Small Business Optimism Index for September.

----- Wednesday, October 15th -----
7:00 AM ET: The Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) will release the results for the mortgage purchase applications index.

8:30 AM: The Consumer Price Index for September from the BLS. 

8:30 AM ET: The New York Fed Empire State manufacturing survey for October. 

2:00 PM: the Federal Reserve Beige Book, an informal review by the Federal Reserve Banks of current economic conditions in their Districts.

----- Thursday, October 16th -----
8:30 AM: The initial weekly unemployment claims report will be released. 

8:30 AM: The Producer Price Index for September from the BLS. 

8:30 AM ET: The Philly Fed manufacturing survey for October. 

8:30 AM ET: Retail sales for September will be released.  

This graph shows retail sales since 1992. This is monthly retail sales and food service, seasonally adjusted (total and ex-gasoline).

10:00 AM: The October NAHB homebuilder survey. Any number below 50 indicates that more builders view sales conditions as poor than good.

----- Friday, October 17th -----
8:30 AM: Housing Starts for September.

This graph shows single and multi-family housing starts since 1968.











9:15 AM: The Fed will release Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization for September.

This graph shows industrial production since 1967.

Note: CR is on vacation until Oct 21st.
This interview was in July 2024 and is still holding up!
I'm not sure about "renowned" but this interview hits several of the key points I've been discussing about housing.

From Lance Lambert at ResiClub: Renowned housing analyst who predicted the 2008 home price crash weighs in on the current market Here is the intro:

Years before the housing bubble burst in 2008, housing analyst Bill McBride began chronicling the troubles in the U.S. housing market in his blog Calculated Risk.

Not only did he predict the crash, but he also called the 2012 housing price bottom. Fast-forward to 2024, and this cycle he hasn’t been as concerned as he was in 2007.

McBride has maintained for the past few years that this housing cycle will ultimately resemble something closer to the 1978 to 1982 period—a time of overheated house price growth that saw spiked interest rates, strained affordability, crashed existing home sales volume, and yet no national home price crash—rather than the 2007-2011 national housing price crash years.

To better understand Bill McBride's perspective on the current housing and economic cycle, ResiClub reached out and conducted a Q&A with him.

Enjoy!

CR Note: On vacation. I will return on Tuesday, October 21st. (If I don't get lost!)

In December 2006, my friend Doris "Tanta" Dungey started writing for Calculated Risk.

When some people say that here are few women bloggers in finance and economics, I remind them that Tanta was the best of all of us!

From December 2006, until she passed away from ovarian cancer on Nov 30, 2008, Tanta was my co-blogger. Tanta worked as a mortgage banker for 20 years, and we started chatting in early 2005 about the housing bubble and the changes in lending practices. In 2006, Tanta was diagnosed with late stage cancer, and she took an extended medical leave while undergoing treatment. While on medical leave she wrote for this blog, and her writings received widespread attention and acclaim.

Here are excerpts from her first two posts:

From December 2006: Let Slip the Dogs of Hell

I still haven’t gotten over the fact that there’s a “capital management” group out there having named itself “Cerberus”. Those of you who were not asleep in Miss Buttkicker’s Intro to Western Civ will recognize Cerberus; the rest of you may have picked up the mythological fix from its reprise as “Fluffy” in the first Harry Potter novel. Wherever you get your culture, Cerberus is the three-headed dog who guards the gates of Hell. It takes three heads to do that, of course, because it’s never clear, in theology or finance, whether the idea is to keep the righteous from falling into the pit or the demons from escaping out of it (the third head is busy meeting with the regulators). Cerberus is relevant not just because it supplies me with today’s metaphor, but because it was the Biggest Dog of three (including Citigroup and Aozora, a Japanese bank) who in April bought a 51% stake in GMAC’s mega-mortgage operation, GM having, of course, once been renowned as one of the Big Three Automakers until it became one of the Big Three Financing Outfits With A Sideline In Cars. I tried to find a link for you to Aozora Bank’s announcement of the purchase, but the only press release I could find for that day involved the loss of customer data. They must have been so busy letting GMAC into the underworld that the dog head keeping the deposit tickets from getting out got distracted.
...
Now, I’m just a Little Mortgage Weenie, not a Big Finance Dog, but bear with me while I ask some stupid questions. Like: how do the Big Dogs maintain “diverse and flexible production channels” (i.e., little mortgage banker Puppies to sell you correspondent business and little broker Puppies to sell you wholesale business) when “market share currently held by top-tier players” expands to two-thirds (meaning less diverse off-load strategies for the Little Puppies in the “production channels,” putting them at further pipeline/counterparty risk unless they become Bigger Puppies, which makes them competitors instead of “channels,”), while at the same time watching some of the Little Puppies (in whom the Big Dogs have a major equity stake) crawl under the porch to die? I know Citi doesn’t seem to have noticed that the “increased regulatory scrutiny” is not just of “products” but of “wholesale operational/management controls,” but I did.

And from December 2006: On Hybrids, Teasers, and Other Mortgage Guidance Problems

First of all, a “hybrid ARM” is called a “hybrid” because it is, basically, a cross between a fixed rate and adjustable rate mortgage. Before the early 90s, an “ARM” basically meant a one-year ARM. The initial interest rate was set for one year, and the rate adjusted every year. The only real variations on this theme involved shortening the adjustment frequency: you could get an ARM that adjusted every six months instead of one year.

Around the early 90s, the “hybrid ARM” was introduced. It had an initial period in which the rate was “fixed” that didn’t match the subsequent adjustment frequency: this is the classic 3/1, 5/1, 7/1, and even 10/1 ARM. The whole idea of the hybrid ARM was to provide a kind of medium-range risk/reward tradeoff for borrowers and lenders.

CR Note: If you want to understand the mortgage industry, read Tanta's posts (here is The Compleat UberNerd and a Compendium of Tanta's Posts).

Also see In Memoriam: Doris "Tanta" Dungey for photos, links to obituaries in the NY Times, Washington Post and much more.