What GAO Found The U.S. Constitution requires each state's governor to issue written orders for special elections to fill vacancies in the U.S. House of Representatives (House). Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, a federal law was enacted in 2005 that generally requires states to hold special elections within 49 days of the Speaker of the House announcing that there are more than 100 vacancies in the House. Under the statute, this is referred to as "extraordinary circumstances." While almost all states have laws for holding special elections to fill House vacancies in general, GAO identified nine states that have laws for holding such elections in extraordinary circumstances, consistent with the federal law. The laws in these states adopt aspects of the federal law, including those related to the 49-day time frame, although most of them do not adopt all the law's requirements. The other 41 states do not have laws that adopt aspects of the federal law, and their laws for holding special elections to fill House vacancies vary in the types of timing provisions they contain. Examples of the timing provisions for holding such elections include specifying the number of days within which states are required to hold the election or giving the governor discretion to order an election within a specific time frame. In the case of extraordinary circumstances, states must follow the provisions of the federal law regardless of whether their laws adopt aspects of that law. GAO surveyed state election officials in all 50 states to obtain their perspectives on holding special elections consistent with the federal law. Nineteen of the 33 officials who responded reported that they were not aware of the federal law prior to hearing about GAO's study. In addition, officials identified a range of challenges related to holding special elections consistent with the federal law. For example, officials reported that selecting candidates through primary elections in time to hold a special election within the 49-day time frame in the law would be difficult. Examples of Challenges that States Might Face in Holding Special Elections in Extraordinary Circumstances State election officials reported that the challenges they identified could affect the accuracy and availability of ballots, pamphlets, and other voting materials; public perceptions of the election; and voting access, such as whether voters have sufficient time to request absentee ballots. However, a number of officials noted that they believed they could hold special elections consistent with the federal law. Additionally, officials identified state practices that might help them hold such elections. For example, officials reported that in some cases states assign responsibility for candidate selection to political parties and noted that this could be done relatively quickly under a special election. Why GAO Did This Study GAO was asked to examine state capabilities to hold special elections to fill House vacancies in extraordinary circumstances, consistent with the federal law. This report provides information on (1) state laws related to holding special elections to fill House vacancies and (2) the perspectives of state election officials on the capabilities of, and challenges facing, states in holding special elections to fill House vacancies consistent with the federal law. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed laws in all 50 states related to holding special elections to fill House vacancies. In addition, GAO conducted a web survey of state election officials in all 50 states to obtain their perspectives on holding special elections consistent with the federal law. To encourage responses, GAO followed up multiple times with non-respondents by both phone and email. Thirty-three states responded to the survey. GAO also reviewed relevant reports and interviewed subject matter experts from four organizations, selected based on their work on this topic. For more information, contact Rebecca Gambler, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov;

What GAO Found After a shutdown of the national airspace in 2023 due to an aging air traffic control (ATC) system outage, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) conducted an operational risk assessment to evaluate the sustainability of all ATC systems. The assessment determined that of FAA's 138 systems, 51 (37 percent) were unsustainable and 54 (39 percent) were potentially unsustainable. Of the 105 unsustainable and potentially unsustainable systems, 58 (29 unsustainable and 29 potentially unsustainable systems) have critical operational impacts on the safety and efficiency of the national airspace (see figure). Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Air Traffic Control (ATC) System Safety and Efficiency Operational Impact Categories by Sustainment Rating FAA had 64 ongoing investments aimed at modernizing 90 of the 105 unsustainable and potentially unsustainable systems; however, the agency has been slow to modernize the most critical and at-risk systems. Specifically, when considering age, sustainability ratings, operational impact level, and expected date of modernization for each system, as of May 2024, FAA had 17 systems that were especially concerning. The investments intended to modernize these systems were not planned to be completed for at least 6 years. In some cases, they were not to be completed for at least 10 years. In addition, FAA did not have ongoing investments associated with four of these critical systems. Selected ATC modernization investments took years to baseline and progressed slowly. Specifically, as of May 2024, nine of the 11 applicable investments established baselines, and eight of them took over 4 years to do so. The other two investments were initiated over 6 years ago, but had not yet established their baselines. In addition, the nine investments plan to take on average 12 years and 8 months to complete all deployment activities—with some taking as many as 15 to 19 years. A contributing factor to the lengthy implementation schedules is that FAA does not always ensure that investments are organized in manageable segments. This is counter to the Office of Management and Budget and FAA policies that require this approach. Until FAA takes urgent action to reduce the time frames to replace critical and at-risk ATC systems, it will continue to rely on a large percentage of unsustainable systems to perform critical functions for safe air travel. This reliance occurs at a time when air traffic is expected to increase each year. Why GAO Did This Study The FAA, within the Department of Transportation, is responsible for the safety and efficiency of over 50,000 flights daily. Air traffic controllers use numerous systems to, among other things, monitor weather, conduct navigation and surveillance, and manage communications. However, over the past several decades, FAA has had challenges with aging ATC systems. These systems will face increased demand given that FAA forecasts air travel will increase, on average, by 6.2 percent annually. GAO was asked to testify on its September 2024 report on aging ATC systems. This testimony (1) identifies unsustainable and potentially unsustainable ATC systems, (2) determines the extent to which FAA has ongoing investments to modernize these systems, and (3) determines the progress FAA has made in baselining and implementing selected modernization investments. GAO reviewed FAA's inventory of systems and the results of an FAA 2023 assessment of system sustainability. Additionally, GAO selected 20 modernization investments to assess baselining.

What GAO Found The Department of Defense (DOD) revamped its acquisition policies in 2020, with the intent to deliver innovative technologies to the user more quickly. These reforms, known collectively as the “adaptive acquisition framework,” established four pathways that weapon system acquisition programs can follow: urgent capability, middle tier, major capability, and software. Each military department issued policies in alignment with DOD's goals and framework, but these policies do not consistently reflect leading practices. In July 2023, GAO found that leading companies use an iterative development structure that includes continuous cycles of design modeling, validation, and production. These iterative processes enable the companies to get products that combine hardware and software—known as cyber-physical products—to market quickly. The continuous cycles allow the companies to gain specific knowledge, such as assurance that the design meets the most essential user needs. Iterative Cycles of Design, Validation, and Production to Develop a Minimum Viable Product While military departments' policies for the software acquisition pathway fully incorporated an iterative development structure, GAO did not find a full structure of iterative development for the urgent capability, middle tier, and major capability acquisition pathways. For example, while Air Force and Navy urgent capability acquisition policies discussed how to refine requirements, they did not include other elements of iterative development such as information on applying user feedback to ensure the design meets essential user needs. Without revised policies and guidance on and examples of how programs can use an iterative development approach, programs across pathways are missing opportunities to deliver capabilities with speed and innovation. The programs GAO reviewed had different understandings of iterative development. Moreover, some program officials stated that they did not think it applied to or was feasible for their program. A pilot program, resulting in practical examples of cyber-physical products that have used an iterative development structure, could provide future programs with lessons learned and opportunities to acquire weapon systems faster. Why GAO Did This Study DOD struggles to promptly deliver capabilities to its warfighters. The 2022 National Defense Strategy emphasized increasing the speed of delivery to meet emerging threats. GAO found in July 2023 (GAO-23-106222) that leading companies iteratively develop cyber-physical products with speed. House and Senate reports include provisions for GAO to assess the military departments' approaches to implementing DOD's adaptive acquisition framework and incorporating leading practices for product development. This report describes the departments' implementation of the framework and assesses the extent to which their approaches are designed to facilitate speed and innovation in acquisition. To do this work, GAO interviewed officials and reviewed relevant policies and guidance from DOD and the three military departments. GAO selected nine acquisition programs, including at least one from each department, and interviewed program officials and reviewed documentation.

What GAO Found The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) acquisition workforce includes government personnel who oversee procurement and related acquisition functions and activities. This workforce includes three key acquisition positions identified in government-wide policy—program managers, contracting officers, and contracting officer's representatives—in addition to eight other DHS-identified disciplines that support acquisitions. In interviews with GAO, acquisition staff from four selected DHS components identified various challenges facing the acquisition workforce. GAO found that 41 of the 55 program managers, contracting officers, and contracting officer's representatives that it interviewed identified heavy workload as their most considerable challenge. Primary Workforce Challenges Identified by 55 Personnel in Key DHS Acquisition Positions Among acquisition program managers, GAO found that lengthy hiring time frames were also a considerable challenge. Twelve of the 17 program managers that GAO interviewed cited this as a challenge. For context, a fiscal year 2023 DHS report noted that acquisition hiring time frames ranged from 3 to 18 months. DHS has not evaluated whether it is effectively addressing the challenges that staff identified, such as those related to workload or the lengthy hiring process. GAO found that DHS and its components have implemented a variety of general efforts to mitigate workforce challenges related to hiring, training, and certification. These efforts included programs for career development, mentoring, and training for acquisition leaders. Without evaluating these efforts, DHS lacks reasonable assurance that it is using the most appropriate methods to support its acquisition workforce. Furthermore, DHS does not have comprehensive data on the size or demographics of its acquisition workforce. DHS entities responsible for the workforce only collect data on certain segments of the acquisition workforce, but have not established a methodology for identifying personnel in the eight other disciplines supporting acquisitions. Without establishing a methodology to identify these personnel and collecting comprehensive data on them, DHS lacks reasonable assurance that its decisions about current and future workforce requirements are based on complete information. Why GAO Did This Study Each year, DHS obligates billions of dollars to acquire a wide range of goods and services. Since its inception in 2003, DHS has confronted numerous challenges related to recruiting, retaining, and managing its acquisition workforce. GAO was asked to review DHS's management of its acquisition workforce. This report examines, among other things, (1) what challenges, if any, the acquisition workforce reported facing, and the extent to which leadership is mitigating these challenges; and (2) the extent to which DHS and selected components have comprehensive data on this workforce to inform decision-making. GAO selected four DHS components based in part on the high value of contract obligations and the number of contracts awarded in fiscal year 2023. These components accounted for about 63 percent of DHS's obligations. GAO randomly selected a nongeneralizable sample of 55 key acquisition staff to interview from these components, and reviewed DHS acquisition program staffing plans and certification data.

What GAO Found The Office of Naval Reactors (Naval Reactors) plans to modernize its facilities for managing naval spent fuel at the Naval Reactors Facility at the Idaho National Laboratory. Naval Reactors plans to continue storing the spent fuel there until the Department of Energy (DOE) develops a repository for permanent disposal. However, as of August 2024, DOE has no formal plans for the development of an interim storage facility or a permanent repository for nuclear waste. GAO reviewed the third baseline revision (the most recently completed) for the Naval Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project (SFHP). GAO found that Naval Reactors' cost and schedule estimates did not fully reflect the key characteristics of credible and comprehensive estimates. For example, Naval Reactors requires its major construction projects to follow Naval Reactors and DOE's project management order. DOE requires cost estimates to use the best practices identified in GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. Naval Reactors did not conduct an independent cost estimate—a best practice. To validate the estimate, its contractor relied on several cross-checks on major cost elements completed by subcontractors external to the project. By following all best practices for credible and comprehensive cost estimates when developing its planned fourth baseline revision, Naval Reactors would have greater assurance that the estimated costs are realistic. Construction of Naval Reactors Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project as of May 2024 Naval Reactors has not conducted independent analyses of the underlying causes of SFHP cost increases and quality assurance problems that have led to the rebaselining. DOE's project management order requires independent root cause analyses of project cost overruns, and of the quality of the work performed. However, while analyses were conducted by the contractor, they were not conducted by staff independent from project management and were thus not independent. Independent analyses of root causes could provide Naval Reactors with more objective and reliable information to oversee the project contractor and help prevent further project cost increases and delays. Why GAO Did This Study Naval Reactors, jointly managed by the U.S. Navy and DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration, is constructing a new facility to replace and upgrade the handling and processing of naval spent fuel. Naval Reactors has experienced challenges completing the project, causing schedule delays and cost increases of more than $2 billion. Senate Report 118-58 accompanying S. 2226, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, includes a provision for GAO to review the status of naval spent fuel and related facilities. This GAO report (1) describes Naval Reactors' plans for managing spent fuel, (2) assesses the extent to which SFHP cost and schedule estimates exhibit key characteristics of reliable estimates, and (3) examines the extent to which Naval Reactors has analyzed the causes of SFHP cost and schedule increases, and quality assurance problems. GAO reviewed agency documents on spent fuel management and the SFHP; compared SFHP estimates with cost- and schedule-estimating best practices; and interviewed Naval Reactors and DOE officials.

What GAO Found The Water Resource Development Act of 2022 (Act) authorized the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) to use other transaction agreements to carry out certain projects to support research activities for its Civil Works program. Other transaction agreements are those other than procurement contracts, cooperative agreements, and grants, and are generally not subject to the same federal laws and regulations applicable to federal contracts or financial assistance. This allows agencies to customize their other transaction agreements to help meet project requirements and mission needs. Since GAO's November 2023 report on this issue, the Department of the Army issued updated guidance on using other transaction agreements, and the Corps initiated its first transaction in support of the Civil Works program. Through this action the Corps sought the development of a proof of concept and design for a large-scale hydraulic structures prototype model to enable testing of innovations at a scale large enough to provide proof of readiness for deployment in the hydraulic structures it operates. The Corps awarded the other transaction agreement in November 2024. Going forward Corps officials expect they may enter into additional other transaction agreements through an existing, Civil Works-focused solicitation for innovative commercial products, technologies, and services called the Commercial Solutions Opening. Why GAO Did This Study Located within the Department of Defense, the Corps has both military and civilian responsibilities. The Act authorized the Corps to use other transaction agreements to carry out prototype projects and follow-on production contracts or transactions to support the basic, applied, and advanced research activities of its civilian Civil Works mission. These prototype efforts can aid the Corps' management of water resources infrastructure including dams, levees, hurricane barriers, floodgates, and other hydraulic structures across the U.S. The Act also includes a provision for GAO to annually report on the Corps' use of its other transaction authority for its Civil Works program. In November 2023, GAO issued its first report on the Corps' efforts to implement and use this authority. This second report updates the status of the Corps' efforts since the 2023 report. To determine this information, GAO reviewed relevant Department of Defense documents and GAO reports and conducted interviews with Corps and Department of the Army officials. For more information, contact Hilary M. Benedict at 202-512-6888 or BenedictH@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Textile waste—discarded apparel and products such as carpets, footwear, and towels—causes harmful effects to the environment, according to academic and federal reports GAO reviewed. These effects include the release of greenhouse gases and the leaching of contaminants into soil and water as textile waste decomposes in landfills. While data on textile waste are limited, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) textile waste data estimates an over 50 percent increase between 2000 and 2018 in the U.S. According to federal, academic, nonprofit, and industry sources, textile waste has increased because of multiple factors, including a shift to a fast fashion business model; limited, decentralized systems for collecting and sorting textiles; and the infancy of textile recycling technologies. Examples of Discarded Textiles Some federal entities have initiated and planned a number of efforts to reduce textile waste and advance textile recycling. For example, the U.S. Department of Commerce's National Institute of Standards and Technology led a workshop on reducing textile waste in 2021 with participants from industry, academia, government, and trade associations, among others, and is researching methods for textile recycling. The U.S. Department of State leads an informal interagency group focused on extending the life of products and materials; this group held a March 2024 meeting focused on textiles. EPA plans to develop a national textile recycling strategy within 5 to 10 years, according to officials. GAO found that most federal entities' efforts are nascent, and their approach depends on their mission and expertise. Further, federal entities carry out individualized efforts on textile waste and recycling and give these efforts a lower priority than other goals. GAO identified opportunities for interagency collaboration to improve these efforts. In 2022, some federal entities took steps to formalize an interagency group, but these efforts have stopped. Interagency collaboration that follows leading practices for enhancing and sustaining collaboration could leverage resources to improve the federal government's capacity to reduce textile waste and advance textile recycling. Why GAO Did This Study While consumers and businesses have options to donate, repurpose, and repair used textiles in the U.S., the majority are discarded into municipal waste streams, according to EPA. The rise in fast fashion has highlighted concerns about textile waste and textile recycling in the U.S., according to EPA officials. GAO was asked to review issues related to textile waste and recycling. This report describes (1) how textile waste affects the environment; (2) how and why the rate of textile waste in the U.S. has changed in the last 2 decades; and (3) federal actions to reduce textile waste and advance textile recycling, and what opportunities exist for entities to collaborate. GAO reviewed laws, agency documents and data, and leading practices for interagency collaboration. GAO interviewed federal officials, representatives from industry, and other nonfederal stakeholders, such as officials from two state agencies and nonprofit organizations.

What GAO Found Eighty-five percent of charter schools nationwide participated in the National School Lunch Program in school year 2022-23, increasing from 64 percent in school year 2018-19, according to Department of Education data. Charter school participation rates varied by states. For instance, 13 states and Puerto Rico had 100 percent participation in school year 2022-23 and five states had less than 50 percent participation. In 2018, the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) in the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) collected information for its annual child nutrition operations study to better understand charter school participation in the National School Lunch and School Breakfast Programs (school meal programs) that could inform potential reasons for state variation. However, due to study challenges, FNS was not able to use the information and has not tried to explore these issues since. FNS officials said that it would be resource intensive to include enough charter schools in a study to obtain statistically valid findings, but the agency has not recently assessed the feasibility or cost of doing so. Collecting information on charter schools in cost effective ways, such as by leveraging prior efforts, could help FNS better support states and schools. Charter School Participation Rates in the National School Lunch Program, School Years 2018-19 and 2022-23 Officials from the 14 charter schools in GAO's review that participate in the National School Lunch Program reported facility, vendor, and staffing challenges in operating school meal programs. For example, most school officials said that limited kitchen or eating space makes it difficult to prepare or serve food, as a number operated in non-traditional spaces. Many of those schools contracted with vendors for prepared meals, but also reported challenges with using vendors, such as canceled contracts. Selected states—which oversee local school meal program operations—and FNS provided assistance that could help charter schools address challenges. Examples of assistance from states included training, funds for facility improvements, and informational resources. Similarly, FNS has provided assistance, such as program guidance in 2018 specifically on charter schools. However, school officials GAO interviewed said they were unaware of some existing resources and would benefit from additional outreach. Specifically, 12 of 14 schools that participated in school meal programs did not know of FNS's 2018 guidance for charter schools, which links to resources and answers questions pertinent to charter schools, although it is available on FNS's website. As more charter schools are participating in school meal programs, taking steps to ensure they receive relevant information through additional outreach could help them address challenges and promote greater access to school meals. Why GAO Did This Study The school meal programs provide nutritious meals to millions of students each day. In fiscal year 2023, federal spending for these programs was $21 billion. It is unclear how many charter schools participate in these programs or what factors can affect their participation. GAO was asked to review charter school participation in school meal programs. This report examines (1) available data on charter school participation in the National School Lunch Program over the past 5 years and factors affecting participation, (2) challenges that charter schools in selected states faced in school meal program participation, and (3) assistance from selected states and FNS that could help address identified challenges. GAO analyzed Education data on charter school participation in the National School Lunch Program for school years 2018-19 and 2022-23. GAO reviewed information from four states and 16 charter schools selected for geographic diversity, program participation, and other criteria; and interviewed state and school officials, visiting schools in two states. GAO also reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations, FNS documents, and interviewed FNS officials.

What GAO Found The National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA)—a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy (DOE)—February 2024 strategy for treating, storing, and disposing of the anticipated increase in nuclear waste from stockpile maintenance and modernization activities is not comprehensive and does not fully address all statutory requirements. When comparing the strategy to the seven key components of a comprehensive strategic plan, GAO found that the strategy substantially meets one key component (see table). Analysis of How the National Nuclear Security Administration's Strategy Follows Key Components of a Comprehensive Strategic Plan Key component GAO assessment Mission statement Substantially meets Problem definition, scope, and methodology Minimally meets Goals and objectives Minimally meets Activities, milestones, and performance measures Minimally meets Resources and investments Partially meets Organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination Partially meets Key external factors Partially meets Source: GAO analysis of Department of Energy information and GAO-13-201. | GAO-25-107636 NNSA's strategy includes a mission statement, but the other key components of a comprehensive strategic plan are partially or minimally addressed. In addition, the strategy does not fully address statutory requirements. For example: Generated waste amounts. Though the strategy's scope is a 25-year period, the 25-year outlook does not include anticipated waste from important upcoming activities, such as reestablishing plutonium pit production capability or surplus plutonium disposition. Coordination with the Office of Environmental Management (EM). The strategy recommends establishing formal coordination mechanisms with EM, which has responsibilities for waste disposal, but it does not define formal coordination or describe NNSA's plans to create this mechanism. Cost estimates. NNSA estimated costs of about $2.5 billion over the next 5 years, but the estimate may not be reasonable, in part because NNSA used inconsistent and unclear information and did not perform risk and uncertainty analyses. Disposal options. The strategy did not identify disposal facilities, including any needed modifications. It states that other locations that could be used to dispose of high-risk waste should be identified or developed. NNSA officials stated that they consider their strategy as a snapshot-in-time report that summarizes the NNSA sites' plans, rather than a plan that sites will follow in the future. Nevertheless, NNSA should include all the key components of a comprehensive strategy and fully address statutory requirements in its next strategy update. Doing so would better position NNSA to increase the probability of the strategy's success and avoid the challenges that have affected efforts to dispose of waste generated by previous atomic weapons production activities. Why GAO Did This Study Decades of nuclear weapons production and research generated millions of gallons of hazardous and radioactive waste. NNSA's ongoing maintenance and modernization activities of the nuclear weapons stockpile are expected to generate a considerable volume of additional waste. However, a Senate committee report questioned whether there are sufficient facilities to address the waste generated by these activities, and whether such facilities are included in current plans and budgets. NNSA was required by statute to develop a comprehensive strategy for treating, storing, and disposing of the waste generated by these activities. In July 2022, NNSA created an office to manage the planning and execution of waste operations and disposition activities for all its missions. A Senate committee report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 includes a provision for GAO to assess NNSA's strategy. This report examines the extent to which NNSA's strategy is comprehensive and addresses statutory requirements. GAO reviewed documents and data from DOE and interviewed department officials.

What GAO Found GAO has previously reported on the challenges and setbacks that the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has experienced in acquiring major IT systems. After three unsuccessful attempts between 2001 and 2018, the department undertook a fourth effort—the Electronic Health Record Modernization program—to modernize its legacy health information system. In 2020, VA began implementing this new system. However, in 2023, VA announced it was halting further deployments and instead was prioritizing making improvements at the five sites using the system. VA's surveys had shown that users were dissatisfied with the system. Specifically, about 79 percent (1,640 of 2,066) of users disagreed that the system enabled quality care. In its 2023 report, GAO made 10 recommendations to VA in areas such as user satisfaction, system trouble reports, and change management. VA concurred with all 10 recommendations but has yet to implement them. In 2016, VA established its Financial Management Business Transformation initiative, its third attempt to replace aging financial and acquisition systems with one integrated system. In 2021, GAO reported that full implementation of the new system was not expected until 2027 at a 10-year life cycle cost of $2.98 billion. As GAO reported in July 2024, full implementation was moved to 2030 and estimated life cycle costs were escalated to $7.7 billion. GAO's 2021 and 2024 reports made a total of three recommendations to VA on cost and schedule estimating and its efforts to manage risks. VA has not yet implemented these recommendations. GAO has also made numerous recommendations on VA's IT governance, software licenses, and cloud computing. However, none of these have been implemented yet. Implementation is pivotal to remedying VA's weaknesses. To help agencies deliver results with their IT initiatives, GAO previously reported on the critical factors that led to successful IT acquisitions across the federal government. Common Critical Success Factors Program officials were actively engaged with stakeholders. Program staff had the necessary knowledge and skills. Senior department and agency executives supported the programs. End users and stakeholders were involved in the development of requirements. End users participated in testing of system functionality prior to formal end user acceptance testing. Government and contractor staff were stable and consistent. Program staff prioritized requirements. Program officials maintained regular communication with the prime contractor. Programs received sufficient funding. Source: GAO analysis of agency data. | GAO-24-107963 Consideration of these critical factors, along with leading practices in iterative product delivery, could help VA achieve successful IT acquisitions. Many of GAO's recommendations are consistent with these critical success factors. Why GAO Did This Study VA depends on critical IT systems to manage benefits and provide care to millions of veterans and their families. The department's investment in IT is substantial—VA obligated about $21 billion in fiscal years 2022 through 2024 for a range of IT products, systems, and services. Due in part to its IT challenges, in 2015, GAO added VA health care to its High-Risk List and in 2019 added VA acquisition management. GAO has conducted numerous reviews of VA IT management. GAO has also reported on critical factors leading to successful IT acquisitions. GAO was asked to testify on (1) VA's acquisition and management of IT and (2) critical factors leading to successful IT acquisitions. GAO summarized its recent reports on VA IT issues. It also followed up on the status of the implementation of relevant recommendations. In addition, GAO summarized its prior report on critical success factors.

What GAO Found The current debt limit process separates decisions on revenue and spending from decisions on debt. As a result, the government periodically runs out of borrowing authority needed to pay existing, legally committed obligations. The Department of the Treasury has used extraordinary measures, which can temporarily free up existing borrowing authority, and cash on hand to continue making payments. However, these resources are limited and eventually run out. Predictions about when the government will no longer be able to pay all of its obligations—the “X-date”—are inherently imprecise due to the unpredictable size and timing of federal cash flows. Consequently, last-minute negotiations on the debt limit can increase the risk of a default. Further, these negotiations do not directly tackle structural spending and revenue levels that contribute to the growing debt. A default would disrupt financial markets, with immediate, potentially severe consequences for businesses and households. A default could also inflict long-lasting damage to the U.S. and global economies (see figure). Potential Effects of a U.S. Default on Financial Markets and the U.S. and Global Economies Why GAO Did This Study To meet the federal government's borrowing needs, Treasury issues debt in the form of bills, notes, and bonds. These securities play a vital role in U.S. and global financial markets. Congress imposes a legal limit on federal borrowing, known as the debt limit. In recent years, when debt outstanding has reached the limit, extended congressional negotiations have frequently brought the federal government close to being unable to continue paying its obligations. If Treasury exhausts its borrowing authority and runs out of cash to continue paying government obligations, a default will occur. GAO prepared this report as part of its continuing efforts to assist Congress in addressing challenges related to the debt limit. This report examines (1) factors related to the debt limit that expose the U.S. to a potential default, (2) immediate consequences of a U.S. default for the U.S. financial system, and (3) longer-term consequences of a U.S. default for the economy. GAO reviewed academic literature and agency documents and interviewed agency officials, economists, and market participants from banks, money market funds, and rating agencies, among others.

What GAO Found Currency transaction reports (CTR) must be filed by financial institutions for cash transactions exceeding $10,000 in a day and are intended to provide law enforcement with highly useful information. The $10,000 threshold, set in regulation by the Department of the Treasury in 1972, has not been adjusted for inflation. Inflation may have contributed to the increase in volume of CTRs filed, which has increased by about 62 percent since fiscal year 2002 (see figure). The inflation-adjusted threshold in 2023 would have been about $72,880. Using an inflation-adjusted threshold would have reduced the number of CTRs filed by at least 90 percent annually since 2014. Currency Transaction Reports Filed, Fiscal Years 2002–2023 GAO identified key challenges and potential inefficiencies in the CTR system: Unused reports. Law enforcement agencies accessed a small percentage of CTRs through either the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network's (FinCEN) BSA Portal or agencies' internal systems, leaving most unused. From 2014 through 2023, law enforcement agencies accessed about 5.4 percent of CTRs filed in FinCEN's BSA Portal during that period. For CTRs accessed in either FinCEN's BSA Portal or agencies' internal systems in 2023 (the most recent full year), law enforcement agencies accessed less than 3 percent of CTRs filed from 2014 through 2023. Difficult and infrequently used fields. Filers GAO interviewed reported difficulty completing certain fields, some of which law enforcement agencies reported infrequently using. Unclear or unhelpful aggregation requirements. FinCEN's requirements for aggregating related transactions exceeding $10,000 in 1 day was sometimes unclear to filers GAO interviewed. Further, some law enforcement agencies noted that large aggregated CTRs of unrelated parties do not provide useful information. By taking steps to reduce the number of unused CTRs—such as through adjusting the reporting threshold—and by eliminating rarely used fields and clarifying aggregation requirements, FinCEN could reduce unnecessary filer burden without affecting CTRs' usefulness to law enforcement. Why GAO Did This Study Financial institutions filed roughly 167 million CTRs in fiscal years 2014–2023. The Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020 includes a provision for GAO to review CTR requirements and issue a report by December 2025. GAO has issued four prior reports in response to the act, including one on law enforcement's use of reports about suspicious financial transactions. This report examines (1) the potential effects of changing the CTR threshold, (2) the extent that CTR requirements align with statutory objectives, and (3) the extent that CTR requirements provide useful information to law enforcement. GAO analyzed data from FinCEN on CTRs filed in fiscal years 2014–2023 and conducted a survey of all 327 federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies that can directly access CTRs (60 percent response rate). GAO also interviewed officials of tribal, federal, state, and local agencies; industry groups representing CTR filers; and 13 financial institutions (selected to represent different asset sizes and types of institutions), as well as privacy and compliance experts. GAO also reviewed relevant laws and regulations.

What GAO Found For fiscal year 2022, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) awarded $2.4 billion to 37 bridge projects through a new grant program—the Bridge Investment Program. DOT's process for soliciting grants for this program fully aligned with a leading practice for communicating with applicants and helped applicants familiarize themselves with the new program and its requirements. Specifically, DOT held webinars, posted frequently asked questions, and set up a dedicated email address to answer applicant questions. The 20 applicants GAO spoke with generally found DOT's communication to be useful. The Brent Spence Bridge, between Kentucky and Ohio, Received a Fiscal Year 2022 Bridge Investment Program Grant However, in its first year implementing the Bridge Investment Program, DOT's processes for evaluating and selecting grants did not fully align with federal regulations and DOT guidance for discretionary grant programs. These DOT processes aligned with some aspects of the relevant regulations and guidance. This included developing and implementing a process to rate each application and documenting selection decisions. However, GAO found that, for fiscal year 2022, DOT did not consistently document its evaluation of applications against the merit review criteria; document that it had reached consensus on all ratings during the quality control review, where a second reviewer verifies the ratings and narratives for each application; or notify unsuccessful applicants about their award status. DOT has since begun notifying unsuccessful applicants about their award status but has not taken action to improve instructions for reviewers on how to conduct and document application evaluations and quality control reviews. Doing so would help DOT more fully ensure that it is implementing the program consistently and making fair grant award decisions in future years. Why GAO Did This Study Many of the bridges that Americans drive over each day need repairs. To help repair and replace these bridges, the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act established a new grant program—the Bridge Investment Program. The act provided $12.5 billion over 5 years for the program. The act also includes a provision for GAO to review DOT's processes for evaluating and selecting Bridge Investment Program projects for award. This report examines the extent to which DOT's three primary processes related to the program—soliciting, evaluating, and selecting grants—align with a leading practice and relevant federal regulations and DOT guidance for discretionary grant programs. GAO reviewed DOT's notice of funding opportunity, evaluation plan, and documentation for the Bridge Investment Program fiscal year 2022 evaluation process—the only complete funding round at the time of GAO's review. GAO analyzed application and award data; and interviewed DOT officials and 20 applicants selected to achieve a mix of eligibility and selection status, among other factors. GAO reviewed evaluation documents for 45 of 388 applications, selected to include a mix of award status, evaluation ratings, and applicant type.

What GAO Found Twelve U.S. agencies provided about $1.9 billion, across 477 activities, to address climate risks in Bangladesh, the Maldives,14 Pacific Island countries, and three U.S. territories in the Pacific from fiscal years 2017 through 2023.This funding was for a range of activities both directly and indirectly related to climate, with some implemented in a single country and others in multiple countries. The activities address areas such as solar energy, reforestation, coral reef and mangrove health, and hazard mitigation. However, the Department of State and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) do not track data on award amount by each country for multi-country activities because the activities are not budgeted for a specific country, among other reasons. By having data that is more precise and readily available, agency officials and policymakers would be better able to ensure the accountability of U.S. funding and make informed decisions about future resource needs. U.S. Agency for International Development Activity in Papua New Guinea to Install Solar Panels to Power a School and Health Clinic Including a Refrigerator Containing Vaccines The Departments of the Interior and State, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) demonstrated that they generally followed most of the six selected key practices for evidence-based policymaking and performance management for the 17 activities GAO reviewed. However, none of the four agencies demonstrated that they consistently followed the key practice related to identifying strategies to address internal and external factors that could affect achieving activity results. Identifying strategies to address such factors can help agencies focus on the aspects of activity implementation that are most likely to encounter risks and to threaten the success of the activity in meeting its goals. Agencies have identified and taken steps to address some challenges affecting climate-related assistance. Federal, territorial, and host governments, and other entities identified challenges such as capacity and resource constraints, limited collaboration, and limited information, such as climate-related data on sea level rise and extreme heat. Some agencies reported taking steps to address some of these challenges, such as leveraging interagency resources and establishing partnership forums. Why GAO Did This Study Countries and U.S. territories in the Indo-Pacific region are among the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, such as sea level rise, coral reef bleaching, and drought. GAO was asked to review federal agencies' assistance to address climate risks to countries and U.S. territories in the region. Also, the Inflation Reduction Act asked GAO to oversee the use of these funds. This report examines (1) the assistance federal agencies have provided to selected countries and U.S. territories in the Indo-Pacific; (2) the extent to which selected agencies have practices to monitor the performance of such assistance in selected locations; and (3) any challenges affecting the provision and use of such assistance and agency efforts to address them. GAO analyzed funding data and documentation of agency activities and monitoring mechanisms; interviewed agency, territorial, foreign government, and activity officials; and conducted site visits to Palau, Papua New Guinea, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and Guam. GAO also interviewed officials in Bangladesh and Fiji. GAO selected agencies and locations based on type and number of activities and geographic diversity, among other factors.

What GAO Found A key component of the federal ethics program is the financial disclosure program, which applies to the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. As the supervising ethics office for the executive branch, the Office of Government Ethics (OGE) interprets ethics laws and issues regulations and guidance for the executive branch financial disclosure programs, among other functions. Regular disclosure of personal financial interests helps ethics officials to identify and address conflicts with the filers' government responsibilities. There are two categories of filers in the executive branch. Public filers are typically high-level officials and career senior employees. Confidential filers are typically lower-level employees whose job duties involve a heightened risk of conflicts of interest (e.g., contracting, procurement, and grants administration). More than 29,000 public reports and 420,000 confidential reports were filed in 2023. Public filers are required to disclose detailed information on assets, nonfederal income, liabilities, positions held outside government, employment agreements, gifts and travel. The public reporting requirements were fixed by law in 1978. Confidential filers generally disclose similar information as public filers, but in less detail. OGE has regularly updated and modified the reporting requirements for the confidential financial disclosure program through the regulatory process. Evaluations of the financial disclosure program have been conducted in its 45-year history. Notably, these studies—spanning 25 years—found that the statutorily-defined reporting requirements for public filers in the executive branch are outdated, inconsistent, and, in some cases, unnecessary. The studies presented recommendations to Congress to revise the public reporting requirements, generally falling into four categories: (1) raising reporting thresholds; (2) changing and reducing the number of categories for reporting value; (3) ensuring consistency across regulations and laws; and (4) eliminating the disclosure of unnecessary information. These studies and their recommendations provide policymakers and lawmakers with information to consider updates or legislative changes to the government's ethics program, as needed. Changes would help reduce filing and review burdens while ensuring that agencies continue to have relevant, reliable, and appropriate information for their conflict of interest reviews. Absent changes to the requirements, public employees will continue to report information that may be too detailed or may not be necessary for an effective conflict of interest review. Legislation would be needed to address these issues. As of October 2024, we had not identified any enacted legislation addressing these specific recommendations. Moreover, while the changes described above may still be relevant and warranted, OGE's last evaluation is almost 20 years old. An updated evaluation could provide Congress with valuable information as it considers changes to the public financial disclosure program. Why GAO Did This Study Since 1989, the Ethics in Government Act has required GAO to report on the effectiveness of the financial disclosure system. The report addresses various aspects of the executive branch financial disclosure program, including requirements for filing and how conflicts of interest may be addressed. To answer these questions, GAO reviewed relevant federal statutes, regulations, and guidance from OGE. GAO reviewed several evaluations of the financial disclosure system over the years. GAO interviewed OGE officials and analyzed data from OGE's Annual Agency Ethics Program Questionnaire from calendar years 2014 to 2023. GAO also reviewed documents and interviewed ethics officials from the Departments of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and National Science Foundation.