Trump–Xi Summit Preview: What's At Stake
Authored by Sean Tseng via The Epoch Times (emphasis ours),
President Donald Trump is scheduled to visit China from March 31 to April 2 for a summit with Chinese leader Xi Jinping. What was already shaping up to be a high-stakes meeting on tariffs, trade rules, tech controls, and Taiwan has become more complicated in the past few weeks.
U.S. President Donald Trump (2R), flanked by Trade Representative Jamieson Greer, Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent, speaks during a bilateral meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping at Gimhae Air Base on Oct. 30, 2025 in Busan, South Korea. Andrew Harnik/Getty Images
This would mark Trump’s first visit to China since returning to office in January 2025.
Before Trump even boards the plane, two developments have altered the landscape. First, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a major part of his emergency-tariff program, restricting the broad tariff authority he had used as a negotiating tool.
Then, a U.S.–Israeli military operation against Iran, which killed the Iranian regime’s supreme leader and disrupted oil shipping routes, triggered a new crisis extending beyond the Middle East. The conflict is already intersecting with the broader strategic competition between Washington and Beijing, as China relies heavily on Middle Eastern energy supplies and has cultivated close ties with Tehran.
Analysts told The Epoch Times that the upcoming summit is no longer just about trade. It also focuses on energy security, supply chains, military signals, and how Washington and Beijing handle risk as global tensions rise.
Trump would head to Beijing with one of his simplest tariff tools weakened, they said. Additionally, the Iran war has exposed several economic vulnerabilities for China, especially its reliance on Middle Eastern energy supplies, the vulnerability of key shipping lanes such as the Strait of Hormuz to disruption, and its dependence on discounted crude imports from sanctioned states—factors that could complicate Beijing’s economic planning and its broader strategic posture.
Xi, meanwhile, would use the meeting to project authority and stability amid military turmoil and economic pressure at home, though not at the cost of appearing weak on tariffs or Taiwan, Su Tzu-yun, director of Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research, told the publication.
Iran War
Before the Iran war, much of the discussion around the summit centered on whether Trump’s tariff leverage had been weakened and whether Xi might use that opening to press for concessions, especially on Taiwan.
The Iran conflict changed that.
The meeting in Beijing will now take place most likely amid an active war in the Middle East. U.S. and Israeli forces have struck thousands of targets in Iran and hold a clear military advantage, while Beijing’s response on behalf of its close strategic partner has been limited to diplomatic statements rather than military action.
That matters because the war has exposed an area where China is particularly vulnerable: energy, Sun Kuo-hsiang, a professor of international affairs at Taiwan’s Nanhua University, told The Epoch Times.
China is the world’s largest oil importer, and it remains dependent on shipping lanes that pass through the Middle East. Research from Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy estimates that about half of China’s crude oil imports pass through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints.
The same analysis says that about a third of China’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports come from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, shipments that also usually transit the strait.
Qatar alone supplies about 28 percent of China’s LNG imports, according to the analysis. But that flow has come under fresh pressure. On March 4, QatarEnergy said it halted LNG production and related products after attacks on facilities in Ras Laffan Industrial City and later declared force majeure on shipments.
China faces another vulnerability: its reliance on discounted crude from sanctioned states.
Because of U.S. sanctions on Iran, much of Iran’s oil has been sold through opaque channels using shadow shipping, ship-to-ship transfers, and third-country routing. China’s customs data has not shown direct Iranian imports since 2022, but tanker tracking indicates the trade continued.
Using Kpler data, Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy estimated that in 2025, China imported roughly 1.38 million barrels per day (bpd) of Iranian crude and 389,000 bpd from Venezuela. Based on China’s record 11.6 million bpd in total crude imports in 2025, Iranian oil would account for roughly 12 percent of the total.
Sun estimated that a disruption in Iran-related supply would push China’s delivered oil import costs up by 20 to 30 percent.
That poses a clear challenge for Beijing, Sun said. If Iran’s export capacity collapses or tanker insurance and shipping become unavailable, China could lose a steady flow of discounted oil that supports its refiners.
“Put simply, China’s vulnerability is oil and sea lanes access,” he added.
From Trump’s perspective, that creates leverage, said Shen Ming-shih, director at Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research.
If a successful U.S. operation in Iran enables Washington, directly or indirectly, to influence Iran’s export routes and nearby sea lanes, including those around the Strait of Hormuz, that could provide the United States with significant leverage on Beijing, Shen told The Epoch Times.
Recent U.S. military actions in Venezuela and Iran, both Chinese strategic partners, also send a broader message: The United States can strike far from home and pressure Beijing-aligned states outside East Asia, Shen said.
The Iran conflict is also serving as an informal test of China’s air defenses and electronic warfare capabilities. Chinese-made air defense systems in Iran have come under scrutiny after they failed to prevent U.S. strikes, he noted.
Key Minerals and Components
The Iran conflict also highlights America’s vulnerability, Shen said.
If China is vulnerable to oil and shipping, the United States remains exposed in parts of the high-end defense supply chain, especially key minerals and components, he said.
“The current U.S. military operation in Iran is consuming large quantities of advanced munitions that require critical minerals controlled by China,” he noted, raising a question about who can actually keep production lines running.
China dominates parts of the supply chain for critical minerals used in semiconductors and modern weapon systems such as precision-guided missiles and fighter aircraft, including the F-22 and F-35, U.S.-based economist Davy J. Wong told The Epoch Times.
According to a July 2025 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, for example, China has a near-total monopoly on gallium production, accounting for 98 percent of the world’s supply, and warns of a growing supply crunch that could affect defense production.
Gallium is used in the radar seekers and guidance electronics of many modern missiles.
“The rivalry is not just about tariffs and chips; it is also about industrial endurance,” Shen said. “It is about keeping factories running, producing consumer goods, missile seekers, or the electronics that make advanced weapons work.”
If the United States is burning through expensive interceptors and precision weapons faster than it can replenish them, Beijing may conclude that Washington is limited in its ability to raise pressure in the Indo-Pacific, or at least may be more cautious about opening a second front of escalation on trade, sanctions, or Taiwan amid the Iran war, Shen said.
“That does not mean China gains immediate advantage,” he added. “At present, there is no clear indication that U.S. defense contractors are experiencing shortages of rare-earth materials that would limit production capacity.”
Tariff Issue
The Supreme Court ruling was a setback for Trump, but it did not eliminate all tariffs or trade tools, so the United States retained considerable trade leverage, Wong said.
On Feb. 20, the court struck down most of Trump’s broad “emergency” tariffs, ruling that the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act, or IEEPA, does not give a president the power to impose sweeping tariffs in the way Trump had tried to use it.
The White House responded quickly. On the same day as the ruling, Trump invoked Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 to impose a temporary 10 percent duty on imports. Then on Feb. 21, he raised that temporary duty to 15 percent for all countries.
Trump’s tariff is not off the table, Wong said.
“That matters because Trump’s negotiating style has often been simple and direct: threaten tariffs, push for concessions, and claim a win,” he added. “The ruling did not take tariffs off the table. It just made the easiest route slower and more constrained.”
The administration is now leaning more heavily on other trade tools, including Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which addresses national security risks, and Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, which targets unfair trade practices.
U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer said on CBS’s “Face the Nation” on Feb. 22 that although “the Supreme Court struck down tariffs under one authority, tariffs under other national security elements remain in place,” and that the administration can launch “additional investigations” that could lead to more tariffs.
However, Wong stated that U.S. policy has not shifted toward easing trade tensions but has instead moved toward developing a new bargaining strategy.
In late 2025, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative launched a Section 301 investigation to determine whether China had been fulfilling its commitments under the Phase One trade deal.
Beijing has answered with warnings. China’s Commerce Ministry said on Feb. 25 it would take “all necessary measures” if Washington used that probe as a pretext for new tariffs.
At the same time, Beijing is signaling that it still wants the Trump–Xi summit and aims to keep overall U.S.–China ties manageable. Lou Qinjian, a spokesman for China’s rubber-stamp National People’s Congress, called leader-level diplomacy “irreplaceable” and pointed to regular communication between the two leaders since last year.
Wong said the message is that the Chinese regime does not want to appear weak, but it also wants to avoid another uncontrolled escalation right before a summit.
Why Xi Needs the Summit to Happen
For Xi, Trump’s visit is useful for reasons that go well beyond diplomacy, Su said.
Xi is dealing with unusual domestic turbulence, he told The Epoch Times. An unprecedented purge within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has shaken the top ranks of the military.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has tallied more than 100 senior PLA officers who have been removed or disappeared since 2022, and even top figures in the Central Military Commission have come under investigation or been expelled.
That points to deep disruption inside the institution meant to guarantee Xi’s authority, Su said. The purge also raises practical questions about military readiness.
CSIS said the leadership gaps created by the purge would make it very difficult for China to launch a major operation against Taiwan in the short term, and that the upheaval has already affected military drills around Taiwan.
China’s economy adds to the pressure. Beijing has set a 2026 growth target of 4.5 to 5 percent, its lowest since 1991, while officials have acknowledged a property slump and broader headwinds.
Given that situation, Su said, Xi is incentivized to pursue a more stable external environment, making the summit important.
“A visit by Trump to Beijing is not just diplomacy for Xi; it is also political theater,“ Su said. ”It allows Xi to project authority, stability, and international stature at a time when all three are under pressure.”
For Trump, there are different ways he can frame the visit, according to Su: “as either a demonstration of dealmaking skills or as an assertion of great-power status diplomacy.”
“Xi can use hosting the summit at home to show that Washington still needs to come to him, on his turf, despite economic challenges, military upheaval, and doubts about PLA readiness,” Su continued. “In that sense, the optics may matter more to Xi than to Trump.”
The Taiwan Issue
Taiwan remains the primary issue, according to Shen.
Trump’s February comment that he had been discussing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan with Xi has stirred concern among some Taiwanese lawmakers and experts that cross-strait issues could become a bargaining chip as Washington and Beijing negotiate on trade and security.
“Although the White House later said there is no change to its policy with respect to Taiwan, Beijing’s objective is clear. It wants Washington to reduce visible support for Taiwan and pull back from what it sees as challenging its claims over the island, such as high-level official contacts and military cooperation,” Shen said.
Washington’s incentives are quite clear, he said. Any sign that Trump is trading away U.S. commitments to Taiwan would trigger backlash at home and unsettle U.S. allies in Asia. “And that leaves a narrow and tense path,” he added.
On Feb. 3, Trump signed a sweeping omnibus appropriations bill that includes more than $1.4 billion to support security cooperation with Taiwan.
Those provisions come on top of an arms sale announced last December, which the administration valued at more than $11.1 billion and described at the time as the largest bundled arms sale to Taiwan in U.S. history.
Despite the worries and speculation, U.S. actions suggest otherwise—those arms sales to Taiwan would likely proceed as planned, Shen added.
What Each Side Realistically Wants
Trump will likely push for concrete economic outcomes, Wong said.
“One goal will likely be to extend or reinforce the existing trade truce. Another aims to ensure purchases and market access, including more Chinese purchases of U.S. farm goods such as soybeans,” he said.
At the same time, the Trump administration is covering its bases with measures such as Section 301 investigations and other tariff tools that could take time to develop as potential leverage if Beijing fails to follow through on its promises later, he added.
That indicates the White House is pursuing two strategies at once: negotiating with Xi at the leadership level while preparing legal cases for more targeted tariffs later, Wong said.
Su added that another major goal of the Trump administration is to pressure Beijing into further curbing the production and export of fentanyl precursor chemicals, a key Trump policy priority in combating illicit drugs.
Xi’s goals differ, as he seeks validation of his authority and international stature amid domestic turmoil, Su said. He also wants to reduce the risk of sudden tariff hikes, protect Chinese exporters as growth slows, and seek relief from U.S. export controls on advanced chip equipment and other critical technologies.
“Regarding Taiwan, Xi would hope to secure some symbolic commitments,” Shen said. “But those would likely remain symbolic because the United States would not violate the Taiwan Relations Act or the Six Assurances.”
The Taiwan Relations Act was passed by Congress after Washington switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 1979. It manages ongoing relations with Taiwan, including security cooperation, arms sales, trade, and cultural exchanges.
The Six Assurances, first conveyed to Taiwan in the 1980s, include commitments that the United States has not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan, will not consult Beijing on those sales, will not mediate between Taipei and Beijing, will not revise the Taiwan Relations Act, has not changed its position on Taiwan’s sovereignty, and will not pressure Taiwan to negotiate with China.
The likeliest outcome, Wong said, is not a fundamental easing of U.S.–China tensions but a temporary effort to manage competition and prevent the relationship from deteriorating further.
Gu Xiaohua contributed to this report.
Tyler Durden
Wed, 03/11/2026 - 19:20
U.S. President Donald Trump (2R), flanked by Trade Representative Jamieson Greer, Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent, speaks during a bilateral meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping at Gimhae Air Base on Oct. 30, 2025 in Busan, South Korea. Andrew Harnik/Getty Images
An FBI press office worker approaches the Fulton County Election Hub and Operation Center in Union City, Ga., on Jan. 28, 2026. Arvin Temka/Atlanta Journal-Constitution via AP
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